CMP-SPRCM-75-37

SELECTIONS FROM PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA MAGAZINES

U.S. ~~AMERICAN~~ CONSULATE GENERAL
HONG KONG, B.C.C.

DECEMBER 22, 1975

U. I. C. C.
FEB 9 1976
LIBRARY

DISTRIBUTED BY:

NTIS
National Technical Information Service
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

KEEP UP TO DATE

Between the time you ordered this report—which is only one of the hundreds of thousands in the NTIS information collection available to you—and the time you are reading this message, several *new* reports relevant to your interests probably have entered the collection.

Subscribe to the **Weekly Government Abstracts** series that will bring you summaries of new reports *as soon as they are received by NTIS* from the originators of the research. The WGA's are an NTIS weekly newsletter service covering the most recent research findings in 25 areas of industrial, technological, and sociological interest—invaluable information for executives and professionals who must keep up to date.

The executive and professional information service provided by NTIS in the **Weekly Government Abstracts** newsletters will give you thorough and comprehensive coverage of government-conducted or sponsored research activities. And you'll get this important information within two weeks of the time it's released by originating agencies.

WGA newsletters are computer produced and electronically photocomposed to slash the time gap between the release of a report and its availability. You can learn about technical innovations immediately—and use them in the most meaningful and productive ways possible for your organization. Please request NTIS-PR-205/PCW for more information.

The weekly newsletter series will keep you current. But *learn what you have missed in the past* by ordering a computer **NTISearch** of all the research reports in your area of interest, dating as far back as 1964, if you wish. Please request NTIS-PR-186/PCN for more information.

WRITE: Managing Editor
5285 Port Royal Road
Springfield, VA 22161

Keep Up To Date With SRIM

SRIM (Selected Research in Microfiche) provides you with regular, automatic distribution of the complete texts of NTIS research reports *only* in the subject areas you select. SRIM covers almost all Government research reports by subject area and/or the originating Federal or local government agency. You may subscribe by any category or subcategory of our WGA **(Weekly Government Abstracts)** or **Government Reports Announcements and Index** categories, or to the reports issued by a particular agency such as the Department of Defense, Federal Energy Administration, or Environmental Protection Agency. Other options that will give you greater selectivity are available on request.

The cost of SRIM service is only 45¢ domestic (60¢ foreign) for each complete microfiched report. Your SRIM service begins as soon as your order is received and processed and you will receive biweekly shipments thereafter. If you wish, your service will be backdated to furnish you microfiche of reports issued earlier.

Because of contractual arrangements with several Special Technology Groups, not all NTIS reports are distributed in the SRIM program. You will receive a notice in your microfiche shipments identifying the exceptionally priced reports not available through SRIM.

A deposit account with NTIS is required before this service can be initiated. If you have specific questions concerning this service, please call (703) 451-1558, or write NTIS, attention SRIM Product Manager.

This information product distributed by

NTIS U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
National Technical Information Service
5285 Port Royal Road
Springfield, Virginia 22161

CMP-SPRCM-75-37

Selections from People's Republic of China Magazines

American Consulate General
Hong Kong

No. 851
December 22, 1975

This edition is printed in the United States of America for dissemination in the Western Hemisphere, Europe, the Mediterranean, and the west coast of Africa from material produced by the American Consulate General, Hong Kong. All queries concerning this edition should be sent to:

National Technical Information
Service (152.12)
U.S. Department of Commerce
Springfield, Virginia 22151

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

(Hsüeh-hsi yü P'i-p'an /Study and Criticism/)

Fight Hard for One Year To Build a Tachai-Type County 1

Water Margin in the 1930's - by Lo Ssu-ting 8

On Water Margin's Reactionary Role in Peasant Wars Toward the End of Ming - by K'ang Li 16

Comment on Hu Shih's Verification of Water Margin - by Yü Ch'iu-yü 21

A Tentative Discussion on Wu Yung - by Chang Chih-ming and Wan Shao-yüan 31

TABLE OF CONTENTS: Study and Criticism, No. 10, October 14, 1975 37

* * *

PRICES SUBJECT TO CHANGE

Reproduced by
NATIONAL TECHNICAL
INFORMATION SERVICE
US Department of Commerce
Springfield, VA. 22151

Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2023

https://archive.org/details/selections-from-prc-magazines_1975-12-22_37

Fight Hard for One Year To Build a Tachai-Type County

- The 1976 Plan of Shanghai County

by

The CCP Shanghai County Committee

(Hsüeh-hsi yü P'i-p'an /Study and Criticism/, No. 11, November 14, 1975)

Editor's Note:

In the current great revolutionary drive to learn from Tachai in agriculture and popularize Tachai-type counties, the Shanghai County Party Committee has mapped out a plan for a year of hard work. This plan has been formulated on the basis of serious discussions by the poor and lower-middle peasants and cadres at various levels of the 2,282 production teams in the whole county. It represents not only a resolution of the 520,000 people of the County but also a challenge to all other counties in the city suburbs. This plan is now published below for the reference of all quarters concerned.

*

The strong east wind of the National Conference on Learning from Tachai in Agriculture has swept every commune and brigade in Shanghai county. The masses of people in the entire county, full of militant spirit, have quickly whipped up a new upsurge in the movement to learn from Tachai in agriculture. We are determined to lead all CCP members, revolutionary cadres and the broad masses in the whole country to vigorously criticize revisionism and capitalism and to build socialism. Pooling our efforts together, we will seriously learn from Tachai and work hard for one year, setting themselves high standards and strict demands in a bid to fulfill in an all-round manner the six criteria for building a Tachai-type county.

(1) We must deepen the education in the Party's basic line, grasp the struggle between the two classes, two roads and two lines, close the capitalist evil road and march toward socialism in big strides. We must direct the spearhead of struggle at a handful of class enemies engaged in sabotage activities, direct our effort toward educating the peasants on Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tsetung thought, and lay the stress on strengthening leading bodies. To this end, it is resolved to form a small detachment devoted to learning from Tachai in agriculture with a group of cadres to be transferred from county-level organs and units as well as commune offices and enterprises and business undertakings. This detachment will then go to the first line of learning from Tachai in agriculture to help communes and brigades unfold education in the Party's basic line. Such education is to be carried

out by stages in the county's 18 communes and 238 brigades, that is, first in one-third of them and then in another one-third. Through this education leading bodies at various levels are to be properly adjusted, the class superiority of the poor and lower-middle peasants is to be further established, the supervisory role of the poor peasants associations is to be brought into full play, and class enemies are to be effectively transformed. Besides, the Party's rural policies are to be seriously implemented, evening political schools in production brigades are to be positively run well, theoretical groups of poor and lower-middle peasants are to be consolidated and developed, and the task of consolidating the dictatorship of the proletariat is to be fulfilled at every grassroots unit.

(2) We must build up the leading body of the county Party committee. The county Party committee holds the key to building a Tachai-type county. After the "three-autumn" period this year, the county Party committee must concentrate its forces on conducting an open-door rectification campaign and seek the help of the masses in identifying contradictions and shortcomings. In subsequent years, apart from conducting an annual rectification campaign, we should hear the criticism of the masses and accept their supervision by the method of going out ourselves or inviting people in, so that the county Party committee will really become the leadership nucleus that firmly carries out the Party's line and policies and unites the masses in struggle and a locomotive in the county-wide drive to learn from Tachai in agriculture. Members of the county Party committee must take the lead in reading and studying seriously, tackling works by Marx, Engels, Lenin and Chairman Mao assiduously, and transforming their world outlook in light of the county's struggle and their own thinking. A resolute struggle must be waged against the revisionist influence in the county Party committee, the corrosion of bourgeois ideology and the reflection of the habitual force of small production. We should neither be "old good fellows" nor seek special privileges, and refrain from granting capitalism a "pass." We should resolutely change the style of leadership, earnestly go to the basic-level units to stay and take the lead in participating in collective productive labor. Of the 14 standing committee members of the County Party and Revolutionary Committees, four will stay in the office to handle the business routine, and the others shall all go to the lower level and shall not return to their office unless they are required to do so. They shall stay at one spot and direct the work there well. They should try to perform a hundred days of labor a year. Meanwhile, a good job should be done in revolutionizing the work of office. This calls for resolutely reducing the number of conferences. Apart from an annual meeting of cadres at four levels and two or three meetings of cadres at three levels in the county, in general there shall be no conference for commune and brigade cadres in the day time. Under the centralized leadership of the Party, a full scope must be given to the functions of the workers', poor peasants', youth and women's organizations.

(3) We must work hard to transform brigades that lag behind. The 32 backward brigades now in the county are to be improved within a year. If they are not improved, they will prove a drag on the county-wide effort

to learn from Tachai in agriculture. But it must be noted that the masses of backward brigades are not backward, that the vast masses of poor and lower-middle peasants urgently demand an improvement of these brigades, that the great majority of Party members and cadres want revolution, and that the potential for higher production is also tremendous. The crucial issue is to adjust the leading squads well and to solve the problem of direction and road. Moreover, we must arouse the masses to adhere to the policy of self-reliance, gradually change the production conditions, and energetically develop the collective economy. Members of the standing committee of the County Party Committee must go down to take charge of separate areas, and they must rely upon the masses, conduct investigations, and set the plans for transformation. The County Party Committee must go over each transformation plan and examine its execution at regular intervals.

(4) We must give full play to the role of school leavers settling in or returning to the rural areas and show overall concern for their growth with the greatest revolutionary enthusiasm. We must encourage them to plunge into the drive to learn from Tachai in agriculture, to be better re-educated by poor and lower-middle peasants, and to play the role of a shock force in the three major revolutionary movements and the great cause of farm modernization. Party organizations at county, commune and brigade levels must have people specially assigned to the work looking after educated young people, hold regular forums attended by them, and hear their criticisms and suggestions. Problems affecting their study, thinking, labor and livelihood should be solved promptly by practical and effective measures. Frequent checks should be made on such questions as their housing, farm tools, food rations, firewood as well as equal pay for equal work. It is essential to encourage and support these rusticated youths to take root in the countryside to make revolution. Wherever possible, communes may also run spare-time universities attended by them. In particular, we must show concern for the physical health of young women. We must resolutely fight against acts running counter to Party policies.

(5) We must carry forward the revolutionary spirit of self-reliance and hard struggle, and carry out farmland capital construction in a big way. We must channel the socialist enthusiasm and initiative of the broad masses of cadres to the effort to develop socialist agriculture. We must take farmland capital construction as a great socialist task and, with the lofty aspirations of the "foolish old man who removed mountains, and transforming China," re-arrange the land of the whole county. In view of the goal of achieving a per-mow grain output of 2,000 catties by 1980, it is necessary to step up the work to transform and adjust the 23,000 mow of high and dry land, 24,000 mow of low-lying land, and uneven plots which account for around 10 percent of the total cultivated acreage in the county. In the current winter and next spring, we must first wage three tough battles with success:

(i) Build water conservation works in a big way. The county should open up 75 kilometers of waterways and dig a total of 433 kilometers of small drainage ditches and big open cannals.

(ii) Some 10,700 mow of high and dry land should be levelled, 16,300 mow of low-lying land should be transformed, and uneven plots should be adjusted, so that high- and stable-yield fields on which a rich crop may still be reaped in times of drought or waterlogging can be increased to 90 percent of the total cultivated area in the county. Given another winter and spring of hard work, all the farmland will give high and stable yields in times of drought or waterlogging.

(iii) Some 50,000 mow of garden farming should be built, so that the area of garden farming with level land, a rational irrigation system, separation of irrigation and drainage channels, roads and bridges will rise to 65 percent of the total cultivated acreage. The total amount of earthwork for the above three tasks will double that of the preceding year.

(6) We must energetically promote technical reform of agriculture and raise farm mechanization to a new level. In light of the county's concrete conditions, some 70 kinds of work related to the growing of wheat, oats and barley, paddy rice, cotton, rape, vegetables and pig-raising should be mechanized. At present, 36 of these have been mechanized or basically mechanized, and 5 have been partially mechanized, so only 29 have yet to be mechanized. In 1976, the main attack will be directed at "two deep" and "four back-bending," that is, transplanting, deep plowing, ditch digging and harvesting of late rice are to be basically mechanized. We must also fully mobilize and actively organize the masses to make a joint effort to produce seedling pulling machines. Farm machinery scientific research networks at three levels should be strengthened and equipped, and an effort should be made to make a machine adaptable to many uses. Existing farm machines should continue to be innovated with the development of farm technology. Positive and effective measures should be taken to raise the political quality and technical level of the 21,000-man technical force for farm machinery.

(7) We must promote scientific farming in a big way and strive to raise the per-unit-area output. In 1976, the county's average per-mow output of grain is to be raised from 1,632 catties in 1974 to around 1,750 catties, that of cotton from 119 catties in 1974 to around 150 catties, and that of rapeseed from 185 catties in 1975 to around 280 catties. To this end, we must energetically promote scientific farming, widely unfold mass scientific experiment activities, further strengthen the agricultural science experiment networks at four levels, and give full play to the role of the existing 10,000-men scientific-technical contingent, besides setting up a "May 7" university for peasants. Experiment plots, demonstration plots and seed plots should be expanded to make up 30 percent of the acreage under grain and cotton. We must strengthen plant protection and bring plant diseases and pests under control. We must vigorously carry out a revolution in seeds and earnestly fix the bases, manpower, tasks, policies and systems. We

must have the determination to breed early-ripening, disease-resistant, lodging-proof, high-yield and good-quality strains suited for the three-crop system of our county. We must strive to achieve three crops a year, with each higher in yield than the other. We must vigorously increase the supply of organic manure, raise pigs and accumulate manure, and combine professional teams with mass movements, so that there will be adequate supply of manure all year round. We must see to it that there will be one pool of manure for every three mow of land and a hundred tan of manure for every mow. We must make an effort to lower the farm cost to below 28 percent.

(8) We must substantially develop the production of subsidiary foodstuff to render better service to the city. Located in near suburbs, our county is charged with the heavy duty of supplying the city with subsidiary foodstuff including vegetables, pork, eggs and fruit. To produce subsidiary foodstuff successfully is a matter of paramount importance directly bearing on the livelihood of city residents and on the consolidation of the worker-peasant alliance; it is an unshirkably glorious task for commune members and cadres of suburban counties. To this end, the county's vegetable production must be based on the state plan, and stronger resistance against natural calamities to achieve a per-mow yield of 120 tan or a gross output of around 6,550,000 tan in 1976. They must be of greater variety and better quality, and there must be a balanced market supply to insure vegetable supply to one-third of the population of Shanghai proper. We must develop a diversified economy with pig-raising as the main item. We must increase the output of green coarse fodder, feed the sows well, handle well the work of plague prevention, and strive to raise 600,000 head of pigs, averaging 1.42 head per mow. Of these, 300,000 head will be supplied to the market, surpassing the state plan by 30 percent and with each person supplying an average of 70 catties of pork to the city. Market supply of domestic fowls should be raised from 120,000 head in 1975 to 250,000 (of which 180,000 from the collective and 70,000 from commune members). Market supply of eggs should be raised from 900,000 catties in 1975 to 1,625,000 catties. We should supply the market with about 5,000 tan of marine products and about 280,000 tan of fruit.

(9) We must energetically develop commune and brigade industries and further strengthen the collective economy at commune and brigade levels. The county now has 433 commune- and brigade-run factories, with gross annual output value of 110 million yuan. If other enterprises were included, total annual output value would be 122 million yuan. Today income at the commune level accounts for 31.9 percent of the gross income of the three-level economies, while that at the brigade level accounts for 17.2 percent. However, the county still has six communes whose annual accumulation amounts to less than 600,000 yuan, and 31 poor brigades reserving less than 10,000 yuan. In 1976, more assistance will be given to poor brigades to develop their industries, arrange their products and find proper supply, production and marketing channels. Existing commune and brigade industries should be generally adjusted and correctly geared to serving agriculture and their business management should be improved. We must insure that accumulated funds at the commune and brigade levels are chiefly devoted to agricultural uses.

By the end of 1976, the proportion of the commune and brigade economies should be raised to about 52 percent of the three-level economies, so that more favorable conditions will be created for the transition from ownership with the production team as the unit to that with the brigade as the unit.

(10) All trades and occupations in the county should be oriented to the idea of taking agriculture as the foundation and make new contributions toward building a Tachai-type county. Industrial departments should direct their main efforts to looking after commune and brigade industries and other basic industries, taking good care of farm machinery, and speeding up the production and trial-manufacture of farm machines. Communications and construction departments must adopt a practical approach to transportation work and the building and maintenance of roads and bridges. Financial departments should use 70-80 percent of the local budgets in 1976 to support agriculture and, in particular, must assist communes and brigades with financial difficulties to develop farm mechanization and improve their production conditions, so that both their collective production and the income of their commune members can reach or surpass the county's present average level as soon as possible. Material supply and commercial departments should actively organize the sources of goods and insure the supply of various kinds of means of production and livelihood. Cultural and educational, health, public security, and militia departments and the five big towns must all make new contributions to building a Tachai-type county. Planned parenthood must be properly guided to keep the birth rate of the county below one percent.

(11) The county, communes and brigades must map out plans for meeting the six criteria of a Tachai-type county and make practical arrangements to achieve them with all-out effort. Both before and after "three-autumn," Party organizations at various levels must fully arouse the masses to draw up a plan for 1976 and a five-year target for struggle on the basis of consultation among all concerned. There should be a monthly progress report, a quarterly exchange of experience, a mid-year examination, and a year-end evaluation. Advanced communes and brigades in learning from Tachai in agriculture in the county must continue to be consolidated and forge ahead. In 1976 another seven communes and 50 percent of the brigades should join the advanced ranks. Thus, the number of advanced communes and brigades in learning from Tachai in the county will reach about 70 percent of the total. When a commune or brigade achieves its advanced status in learning from Tachai, it should be seriously examined and confirmed by the County Party Committee. All trades and departments must also map out their own annual and 5-year work plans around building a Tachai-type county and carry them out in a practical way.

Strong are the passes and tortuous are the roads, but now we must march to take them. At present, a great revolutionary movement to learn from Tachai in agriculture and popularize Tachai-type counties is sweeping across the land. The situation is both excellent and pressing. We must seriously carry out Chairman Mao's three important instructions

on the study of theory, on combating and preventing revisionism, and on stability and unity and pushing the national economy forward. We must guard against arrogance and rashness and have the determination to build Shanghai County into a genuine Tachai-type county through a year of arduous struggle, fearless of sacrifice and resolved to surmount every difficulty!

* * *

Water Margin in the 1930's

by

Lo Ssu-ting (罗思鼎)

(Hsüeh-hsi yü P'i-p'an /Study and Criticism/, No. 11, November 14, 1975)

A moderate wave of interest in Water Margin appeared in the 1930's. The April 1934 issue of Jen-yen /人言 People Talk/ weekly declared that Water Margin "has been quite popular recently, with Madame Buck having translated it into English and the American press reviews raving it as the work of Homer of the East. We haven't boasted of this and instead others have given us a big boost." After glancing over the publications of the 1930's we can discover that Water Margin was on its way up. Favorable foreign comments aside, Chinese boasts were not wanting. There was an assortment of reviews and commentaries, plus a number of strange sequels. Things were indeed humming.

Why was Water Margin so popular at that time? This was far from accidental. In the first winter of the 1930's, that is, December 1930, Chiang Kai-shek personally convened the "bandit suppression" conference at Nanch'ang. Since then he launched five major campaigns to besiege the red revolutionary base areas. This period was marked on the one hand by counter-revolutionary "encirclement and suppression" and, on the other, by the deepening of the revolution. Two types of counter-revolutionary "encirclement and suppression" prevailed, namely, military and cultural.

In "encircling and suppressing" revolutionary forces, reactionaries of succeeding generations invariably employed the "old score." In early Ming, Shih Nai-an summed up the "encirclement and suppression" experience of the reactionary rulers since the Sung Dynasty and wrote Water Margin for the use of the feudal rulers. What was copied was in turn copied by others. Several hundred years later, Chiang Kai-shek's henchmen reached for Water Margin in nearly the same frame of mind as the Water Margin author in his time.

Hu Shih, patron of the New Moon School, was the first to find out the possible use of Water Margin by the Kuomintang reactionaries for their counter-revolutionary "encirclement and suppression." As early as 1929, Hu Shih and his "New Moon School" partners such as Liang Shih-ch'iu, Lo Lung-chi and Hsü Chih-mo had openly joined Chiang Kai-shek, enemy of the people. In that year he wrote the "Foreword to the 120-Chapter Water Margin of Loyalty and Justice" and stressed the novel's theme as "there is peace under heaven only after the brigands are exterminated." This is nothing more than providing Chiang Kai-shek with the means to safeguard the "peace" of the Chiang family "empire" through suppression of the revolution. At the end of that year, Chiang Kai-shek in a circular to the whole country called for recruitment of lackeys and declared that "all words of wisdom will be accepted." Hu Shih thereupon hurriedly wrote to Ch'en Pu-lei, Chiang's adviser, and requested him to present to Chiang copies of the New Moon, in the hope that Chiang would spare some of his

time to read the views expressed in the journal. Since these "views" embraced none other than idea that "there is peace under heaven only after the brigands are exterminated," these "words of wisdom" were naturally "accepted." No wonder Chiang later personally sent for Hu and asked him about the "general situation."

An important indicator of Chiang Kai-shek's "acceptance" of the New Moon School's "words of wisdom" was the infiltration into the literary sphere by secret agents of the CC clique, which was directly related to the Chiang gang, for direct participation in cultural "encirclement and suppression." These secret agents and military police without any literary background to speak of were also drawn to Water Margin. In early 1933, Sa Meng-wu, one of the CC clique's "ten reactionary professors," dished up a lengthy article entitled "Water Margin and Chinese Society." This article, described as a "fine article" and helpful to "waking up the mind and clearing the sight," appeared in 17 installments in "Central Current Affairs Weekly" under the direct control of the Kuomintang Central Committee. According to the "introduction" by that journal, the merit of the article lay in the vilification of all insurgent peasants in Chinese history as "hooligans," the Liangshan insurgent army as "a body organized by hooligans," and the destruction of the peasant uprising as contributing to a "better and more stable social order." Sa Meng-wu spoke favorably of the "spirit and power of resistance" of the armed landowners in Chuchiachuang and Tsengtou City and said "they were many times superior to the government troops." He was in fact attaching importance to the role of the armed forces of landlord home-returning groups. He was directly referring to fascist-oriented military operations and politics, rather than discussing Water Margin.

The notorious Butterflies School also entered the scene. The Hsin Chiang-su Pao /New Kiangsu News/ in 1933 carried serialized installments of The Decline of "Water Margin" by Ch'eng Shan-chih, a pawn of the Butterflies School. This crudely written sequel fabricates episodes about the fatricide of Liangshan captains and reviles the Liangshan brigands as facing their "last days." In this work Ch'eng gave vent to his bitterness toward the peasant revolution during the period of the Second Revolutionary Civil War. The book begins with Lu Chün-i awakening from his nightmare and ends with Chang Shu-yeh's capture of Sung Chiang and 35 Liangshan people after they fled to Haichou following the collapse of the mountain stronghold. It serves as a vivid account of the success of counter-revolutionary armed suppression. Like other members of the Butterflies School, Ch'eng was not as close to the reactionary authorities as Hu Shih and Sa Meng-wu, and so he repeatedly advertised himself as "above" politics and declared his "apathy to the affairs of the world." In reality, he was not unmindful of current affairs. Didn't he try to abet the cause of the counter-revolutionary "encirclement and suppression" of the Kuomintang reactionaries through his elaborately conceived book?

Apart from the afore-mentioned commentaries and sequels to Water Margin that were clearly motivated by and geared to "encirclement and suppression," we could detect another tune at that time. For instance, Lin Yü-t'ang, "shuttling between the Chinese and foreign masters,"

discussed Water Margin with a presumably "funny" sense of "humor" in regret of his participation in the "encirclement and suppression." The Confucian Analects School represented by Lin made a practice of collecting amusing anecdotes to dilute the smell of blood exuding from their ferocious "masters" for the purpose of dissipating the people's revolutionary consciousness. Lin and others thus served as a batch of alert and clever cultural lackeys. They discussed Water Margin and Chin Sheng-t'an often in a rather casual and off-the-record manner to preach their above-class "sentiments." One article entitled "The Confucian Shop and Liangshanpo" said: "Confucius treats Tzu Lu /a disciple/ in the same fair and just way as Sung Chiang treats Li K'uei." It put the capitulationist Sung and the anti-capitulationist Li K'uei on the same footing. And "fair and just" revealed the author's appreciation for Sung's plot to win people's support. Although this self-important dialectician disdained to discuss arms, he nevertheless offered to the reactionaries the idea of using the doctrines of Confucius and Mencius to woo and corrupt the revolutionaries.

Having close ties with Lin Yü-t'ang was an American woman missionary. She was called Madame Buck, but she adopted Sai Chen-chu as her name in Chinese. This bourgeois writer was also much taken by Water Margin. She translated Chin Sheng-t'an's mutilated 70-chapter version into English and changed the original title to All Men Are Brothers. The new title in effect refines what she wanted to obtain from the novel, for "all men are brothers" serves as an elaboration of Lin's interpretation of fraternal "feelings" -- an expression derived from the theory of class reconciliation. Sai Chen-chu also contributed to the journal edited by the Analect Group to trumpet Water Margin's "greatness" and said "this novel is not subject to the limitations of time, for it embodies indelible truth, past or present." What did she mean by the novel's timelessness and "indelible truth"? Perhaps she implied that the class reconciliation and capitulationist theses preached by Water Margin could be useful to the reactionaries, past and present, in China or elsewhere. Lu Hsün pointed out incisively when he came upon the translation: "The title of the book All Men Are Brothers is not particularly precise since the people of the mountain stronghold did not treat everybody as brother." Lu Hsün's words effectively punctured the tricks used by all reactionaries, past or present, in China or elsewhere, to preach class reconciliation and abolish revolutionary struggle.

The spirit of the Analect Group's fraternal feelings and Sai's accent on brotherhood is further embodied in a sequel to Water Margin, a work running to 200,000 words and written by Chiang Hung-fei. He regretted the lack of the middle section of the book he described as "national treasure par excellence," calling Chin Sheng-t'an's mutilated 70-chapter version as the "upper section" and Chen Ch'en's 40-chapter around the "lower section." Therefore, he added another 30 chapters to bridge the gap. His work begins with Lu Chün-i's nightmare and ends with the return of Juan the Seventh to Shihchieh Village. It concentrates on the depiction of the "benevolent legion" led by Chang Shu-yeh that refrains from resorting to killing to attain a state of "harmony and peace." His book also heaps praises on Sung Chiang and commends his "acceptance of the

amnesty and enlistment offer" and his dedication to "serving the state." While Chiang's work largely retains the episode about the poisoning of Sung Chiang as depicted in the 120-chapter Water Margin, it includes a conversation between Juan the Seventh and his mother after the death of Sung Chiang. Learning about the poisoning of Sung Chiang, Li K'uei and others on the instructions of the imperial court, Juan flies into a rage and is ready to lead his men and fight his way to the Eastern Capital. His mother then admonishes him to be "loyal" to his country and keep to his "filial duty." This frightens Juan into submission and dissuades him from rising in revolt.

A quick glance at the public interest generated by Water Margin in the 1930's reveals that two groups were largely involved. One group was represented by Hu Shih and Sa Meng-wu, who were eager to use Water Margin to give vent to their bloody desire to "exterminate all the brigands." The other group was led by Lin YÜ-t'ang and Sai Chen-chu, who played down slaughter in order to preach reconciliation. The two approaches appeared antagonistic yet they complemented each other.

Playing down slaughter is intended for one side only. In Chiang's work, for instance, Chang Shu-yeh utters the words implying giving up slaughter but Juan the Seventh does it. In substance, this means that Juan is to surrender to the feudal ruling class. Chiang Hung-fei "kills" Juan the Seventh with Confucian and Mencian "filial duty," not with a knife or spear. In a similar vein, Lin's interpretation of "fraternal feelings" and Sai's reference to "all men are brothers" serve a similar function. Just imagine, if everybody talks about sentiment and brotherly affection, is there any need at all for revolution? The only way out for those who have joined the revolution is repentance and surrender. It wasn't easy for Chiang Hung-fei to make Juan the Seventh submit to the feudal court and the reactionary troops, however much he would have liked Juan to do it. He hit upon the idea of bridging the gap by making Juan submit to "filial duty" first. As a matter of fact, if a revolutionary submits to preachings of "sentiment" and "all men are brothers," then his revolutionary career will also end. Class harmony invariably leads to class surrender. Therefore, this group of soft-spoken "mediators" in fact took part in the counter-revolutionary "encirclement and suppression" by luring others to surrender.

Those who played tricks to induce others to surrender did not renounce the use of force to slaughter revolutionaries. To put it another way, they lured people to surrender for the explicit purpose of getting rid of them. When the revolutionaries who were tricked into surrendering themselves were executed, these double-dealers ceased raising those sweet slogans, for their purpose had been achieved. Therefore, this group of people were murderers in disguise. Sometimes, they could throw off their disguises and become open killers. Hu Shih, for one, underwent this transformation. Like Lin YÜ-t'ang and his ilk, Hu for a long time took upon himself the task of peddling "democracy," "fraternity" and "human rights" preached by the bourgeoisie abroad. All these activities in the long run were aimed at luring the anti-imperialist and anti-feudal people's revolutionary contingent to surrender. In the

same vein, he emphasized the merits of Sung Chiang's surrender to the court and his loyalty to the emperor when he was commenting on Water Margin in the 1920's. However, he was bitter about the failure of his preachings to deter the revolutionary contingent from forging ahead. On the other hand, he was grievous of having been misunderstood by the reactionary authorities. Therefore, when the storm of armed struggles surged during the Second Revolutionary Civil War, he could not help uttering what he had had in mind for a long time -- "exterminate all the brigands" -- through his verification of Water Margin. Once he had uttered these words, he was in the fold of hangmen like Chiang Kai-shek and secret agents of the CC clique, becoming the backbone of the counter-revolutionary cultural "encirclement and suppression." As a matter of fact, what Hu Shih had uttered had been in the minds of people like Lin Yü-t'ang and Sai Chen-chu.

Neither did the group in favor of slaughter entirely renounce the use of trickery to induce surrender. In resorting to these tricks, the reactionaries of the 1930's were much cleverer than Chin Sheng-t'an who lived 300 years before. Even though Ch'eng Shan-chih, author of The Decline of Water Margin, with a stroke of his pen drowned the entire Liangshan insurgent army in a blood bath, he described with apparent relish Sung Chiang's surrender and the attempt of the reactionary authorities to lure and accept surrender. One episode in the book is about Sung Chiang's submission through a third party of a "declaration of repentance" to Ts'ai Ching. A commentator wrote this comment on the book: "Sung Chiang's admission of his guilt may be favorably compared to a certain gentleman's steadfast refusal to make revolution." A "certain gentleman" here obviously referred to the renegades who betrayed the revolution after the defeat of the First Revolutionary Civil War. At a time when the revolutionary situation was swiftly developing, even a blood-thirsty hangman found it necessary to play some tricks, such as citing a proverbial saying "Lay down the butcher knife and become a Buddha," and took luring others to surrender as his chief duty. We often came upon cases in which wicked despots talked about doing good deeds and warlords visited Buddhist temples.

Both Chiang Hung-fei and Ch'eng Shan-chih were feudal dregs identified with the Butterflies School. Chiang wrote the sequel to Water Margin only two years later than Ch'eng. Why, then, did Chiang drop Ch'eng's ferocious appearance and become an interesting preacher of moral virtue? This is exactly illustrative of the different stratagems in respect of "encirclement and suppression" that the reactionaries employed under different conditions. Ch'eng wrote The Decline of Water Margin in 1933, the year in which Chiang Kai-shek was planning his fifth counter-revolutionary military "encirclement and suppression" after having suffered repeated setbacks. The emphasis was therefore on counter-revolutionary armed suppression. On the other hand, Chiang's work appeared in the summer of 1935, when Chairman Mao at the head of the Chinese Workers and Peasants Red Army had commenced the world-famous Long March. At that moment, the struggles waged by the workers in areas controlled by the Kuomintang were developing and the peasants' struggles were also deepening. The student movement was at its height.

Various revolutionary forces converged and formed a powerful revolutionary torrent. Chiang Kai-shek, finding the use of force ineffective, stepped up the political offensive in the hope that capitulationists like Sung Chiang would appear within the Chinese Communist Party. That was why Chiang's work Story of "Water Margin" heaped praises on Sung Chiang and identified him as one who "knows nothing except obeying government orders," vainly trying to lure the vast numbers of Chinese Communist Party members and the revolutionary people to come forward and obey Chiang Kai-shek's "government orders," abandon the revolution and willingly become his loyal "subjects." This shows that their actions were in complete accord with the political needs of the reactionaries.

The "encirclement and suppression" of the people's revolution and a book that preaches capitulationism thus merged the interests and destinies of all types of reactionaries. Despite the alternation of bloody slaughter and deceit, these two things became increasingly identified with each other in the fierce struggle between forces for "encirclement and suppression" and those against "encirclement and suppression," so there was almost no dispute of any kind between the two groups. The mighty revolutionary storm caused all kinds of people in society to divide and coalesce anew on the basis of the interests of their own class, thereby further forging the strength of the revolutionary contingent and bringing about immense changes in the counter-revolutionary camp. Despite the appearance of conflicting schools of thought in the intellectual and cultural circles since "May 4," under the impetus of the new revolutionary situation "high class Chinese," scholars and professors joined forces with the Butterflies School -- the cultural dregs they previously despised. In this development the convergence of comprador culture and feudal culture by far drew most public attention. Hu Shih's advocacy of "wholesale Westernization" came into conflict with that of Sa Meng-wu and others who were in favor of a feudal "departmentalist culture." But they were in complete accord in respect of praising Water Margin and taking part in the counter-revolutionary "encirclement and suppression." The fact that the promoter of "wholesale Westernization" bowed to this typical work of feudal literature strongly testifies to the inevitable forging of a reactionary alliance between the slavish ideology of imperialism and the revivalist idea of Chinese feudalism.

The capitulation of Hu Shih and others to feudal culture was aimed at forcing the revolutionary people and revolutionary culture to surrender to the entirely reactionary class. This development suited Chiang Kai-shek admirably. He had just conceived the so-called "New Life Movement," a campaign to collect weapons consigned to mothballs. In launching his counter-revolutionary cultural "encirclement and suppression," Chiang picked from the doctrines of Confucius and Mencius something with which he could prepare a hodgepodge of reactionary philosophy and culture. What for? According to his own admission, the idea was to use "moral rejuvenation to bring about national rejuvenation," with the "main emphasis on changing mentality." "Moral rejuvenation" was expressly intended to rebuild the Confucian shop demolished by the May 4 Movement and to peddle such Confucian stuff as "loyalty, filial piety, benevolence and love."

"Changing mentality" was meant to rid people's minds of Marxism-Leninism spread to China after the October Revolution and to replace it with fascism. The whole idea was therefore to reinforce the "spiritual fortress" of the big landlord and bourgeois classes "among the masses of people."

In terms of the goal and approaches, the "New Life Movement" was basically similar to Water Margin in spirit. That is why many people at that time openly praised Water Margin as "an exceptionally fine book for promoting the new life." The author of Story of "Water Margin" also said frankly: Sung Chiang "personifies loyalty and devotion to the government, and his fearlessness in the face of death embodies the essence of the current new life." Indeed, Chiang Kai-shek hoped that more Sung Chiangs would appear in China and that everybody would submit to the Kuomintang's fascist rule and give his life for the Chiang family empire. Thus, the Water Margin fever in the 1930's became closely identified with the "New Life Movement."

Where there is reaction there is progress. Where there are capitulationists there are anti-capitulationists. The butcher knives wielded by the reactionaries failed to halt the march of the people's revolution and their sinister attempts to lure people to surrender likewise were unsuccessful. The "encirclement and suppression" undertaken by Kao Ch'iu, T'ung Kuan and Chang Shu-yeh failed to extinguish the fierce flames of the peasant revolution in the Sung Dynasty. Similarly, Water Margin could do nothing to prevent the Ming court from collapse. Despite the efforts of Hu Shih and others to invoke Water Margin and curse the Chinese Communist Party and the people's revolution until they were "exterminated," "the result was just the opposite for the two kinds of 'encirclement and suppression' all ended in failure." "One common outcome of these two kinds of 'encirclement and suppression' was the awakening of the people of the whole country." "In this 'encirclement and suppression' Lu Hsün the Communist became a great man of the Chinese cultural revolution." On the ideological and cultural front in the 1930's, Lu Hsün repulsed the cultural 'encirclement and suppression' launched by the Kuomintang reactionaries. He also uncovered an assortment of intrigues and conspiracies designed to lure people to surrender. Besieged by the enemy who employed soft and tough tactics, Lu Hsün refused to submit. He thus demonstrated the precious character of the people of the colonial and semi-colonial land.

Not to yield is to be prized, but what is more so is that Lu Hsün employed different kinds of ideological weapons in his castigation of the enemy's "encirclement and suppression." When the Kuomintang reactionaries and their lackeys were whipping up the Water Margin fever, Lu Hsün resisted this reactionary tide. In his criticisms of Water Margin, he explicitly pointed out in the early 1930's that "the book Water Margin makes it very clear that because they were not against the emperor, they accepted the amnesty and enlistment offer when massive government troops arrived, and set out to fight for the state those bandits who did not 'carry out the wish of Heaven.' They were lackeys after all." This laid bare the essence of Water Margin in preaching

capitulationism and ripped off the mask of Sung Chiang the lackey. This served as a forceful rebuttal of Water Margin in the 1930's.

However, not all people can resist the enemy's "encirclement and suppression." In sharp contrast with Lu Hsün, in the revolutionary camp "some people withdraw from active service, some take to the wilderness, some degenerate, and some mutineer." Chü Ch'iu-pai was a typical example. He submitted to the pressure exerted by the Kuomintang reactionaries and went down in the torrent of white terror, becoming a despicable capitulationist. In fostering a capitulationist, the reactionaries invariably begin with attempts to influence his thinking. Chü Ch'iu-pai's political degeneration likewise had its ideological source. As early as July 1932 Chü responded to the Water Margin fever stirred up by the Kuomintang reactionaries by praising it as a "valuable literary classics." He even called on every writer to "strive to emulate Shih Nai-an," indicating that he had something in common with the capitulationists advertised by Shih. For instance, he once said that the peasants "cannot manage to get by without the emperor," adding that the peasants' "political demand is for 'blue heaven and white sun' (incorrupt officials and a good emperor)." This fallacy was no better than Water Margin's theme of "opposing corrupt officials only, but not the emperor." If the emperor is not to be opposed and if the state machine of the reactionary class rule is left untouched, what is revolution for? Failing to solve this vital question of principle, people will sooner or later show the cloven hoof before the enemy's "encirclement and suppression" and surrender. That is why after he was captured and put in jail in 1935, Chü wrote what he called "superfluous words" to aver his participation in the revolution as "a misunderstanding in history." Like Sung Chiang, he went to Liangshan and then wanted to quit.

The Water Margin fever which swept in the 1930's provided us by negative example with a touchstone, which, throughout the class struggle, distinguished revolution from counter-revolution and progress from reaction, apart from examining true and false revolution and tough and soft bones in the revolutionary camp. In his struggle against the reactionary men of letters who were vying with each other in applauding Water Margin, Lu Hsün was tempered and emerged a tough fighter. On the other hand, Chü Ch'iu-pai compromised and defected and was cast behind by the rolling river.

Thoroughgoing materialists have nothing to fear. We should not be afraid of debate or of being besieged. Nor should we fear that some people have been eliminated. After the sand is sifted the gold glitters. It was so in the 1930's, and it is so today and will be so tomorrow. As long as reactionary ideas and culture exist and as long as the revisionist trend of thought prevails, we must keep struggling on the ideological and cultural front, fighting unremittingly against all capitulationist notions. Marxism will surely develop in struggle, and such is our faith.

* * *

On Water Margin's Reactionary Role in Peasant Wars Toward the End of Ming

by

K'ang Li (康 立)

(Hsüeh-hsi yü P'i-p'an /Study and Criticism/, No. 11, November 14, 1975)

In the endlessly churning waterways of history the wave rises to the surface but the deep current is submerged. What appears as the wave is false and what is submerged is the essence. But even the current itself, which serves as the substance of history, is not without whirlpools and adverse current. It abounds in contradictory and complex phenomena.

To gain a correct understanding of the effects of Water Margin on peasant wars, it is essential that one should not be deluded by what appears as the wave. Water Margin was originally an "official publication." It was printed in quantity under the auspices of the highest supervisory organ of the Ming Dynasty -- the Ministry of Censorship. This "official publication," however, influenced in no small measure the peasant wars which occurred toward the end of Ming. Quite a few peasant insurgent leaders at the time adopted the nicknames of such Water Margin characters as "Black Whirlwind" and "Living Plato" or simply borrowed the names of Sung Chiang, Ch'ai Chin and others. Even Liangshan-type numerical formations were adopted by various insurgent columns when they joined forces. Their keenness in borrowing the "garb" of Water Margin characters, in turn, served to give Water Margin the "garb" of the "peasant revolution" and this led to different appraisals of the novel. While some claimed it had "stirred up" the "tragic misfortune" of a "rising of brigands," others said it inspired the eruption in later generations of great peasant revolutionary wars. These two views appear to contradict each other but they are essentially the same. Judging by the theory of knowledge, they saw only the wave on the surface and not the submerged current and thus caused people to confine themselves to the appearance of things.

The wave is something that is not essential and is false in appearance, being not as stable or firm as the current. The effect of Water Margin on the late Ming peasant war was the wave, while the war itself was the deep current in the long river of history. Yet the wave is a reflection of the substance since it is the outcome of the clash between the tide of history and the reactionary adverse current. The impact of Water Margin on the late Ming peasant wars is a reflection of the submerged whirlpools and adverse current that appeared in the revolutionary torrent of the peasant wars in that period. Taking part in the peasant uprisings then were peasants and handicraftsmen as well as landlords, officials and intellectuals driven out from the feudal ruling class. Some of them accepted Water Margin's influence, others didn't. Even among those who did accept, some had a liking for Li K'uei, who was against taking the amnesty and enlistment, while some idolized Sung Chiang, who surrendered. This illustrates that Water Margin produced rather different ideological effects on various kinds of people.

The late Ming peasant wars developed in a devious and wave-like manner. At the start of the revolution, the class front of the insurgent contingents was not very clear-cut. On the surface, all appeared to direct their struggles against corrupt officials. Within the landlord class, one faction, in order to oppose another, unfurled the banner of "opposing only corrupt officials but not the emperor." Since the revolutionary peasants only gradually came to understand the feudal court, they often proceeded from punishing individual corrupt officials or local despots and the wicked gentry before taking the revolutionary road. As the originator of the late Ming peasant uprisings, Wang Erh at the outset was against Chang Yao-tsai, magistrate of Ch'engch'eng county, for imposing heavy levies, and so he issued the call to kill Chang. Although this appeared to be similarly "against corrupt officials," the revolutionary insurgent peasants' approach was radically different from the stand taken by the Sung Chiangs of Water Margin. In the case of the former, opposing corrupt officials was the beginning of the revolution, which eventually would be aimed at opposing the emperor and overthrowing and transforming feudal rule by revolutionary means. In the case of the latter, opposing corrupt officials meant the end of the "revolution" since they were ready at all times to surrender to the feudal rulers in a futile attempt to achieve their clandestine political motives through the transformation and utilization of the insurgent peasants. On the surface, the two types of people appeared to have a common point of departure, but they not only differed in their motivation and ultimate goals but followed completely different paths of development. The uprising of the former was the mainstream of the torrent of the late Ming peasant revolution, while that of the latter was a reactionary adverse current hidden in the revolutionary torrent. At the start of the revolution, the superficial consistence of both sides covered up their essential inconsistence. However, following the advance of the torrent of the late Ming peasant revolution, particularly when feudal rule as a whole was threatened, the divergence of both sides rapidly came into the open and became apparent. While the former was bent on breaking Water Margin's fetters, the latter sought to fit the uprising into Water Margin's prescribed pattern. It is precisely under these circumstances that quite a few renegades appeared in the peasant army toward the end of the Ming period. That is why many like Yang Szu-ch'ang of the Ming imperial court regarded the offer of amnesty and enlistment as an important supplementary approach to suppression.

However, the surging revolutionary torrent could in no way be stemmed by any reactionary adverse current. The development of history shows that it is not Water Margin which led the late Ming peasant war to end up like Liangshan. Rather, it is the mighty force of the peasant war which broke down the capitulationist pattern prescribed by Water Margin. At its inception, the peasant insurgent army led by Li Tzu-ch'eng was not able to free itself from the reactionary ideological fetters such as "opposing only corrupt officials but not the emperor," so for a long time it remained at the stage of robbing the rich to help the poor, manifesting itself in the political thought of brigandism. However, development of the revolutionary practice contributed to the purifying of the ranks of the Li Tzu-ch'eng insurgent army and to defeating and

overcoming the impact of the capitulationist trend of thought. Before and after the 13th year of Ch'ung Chen, Li Tzu-ch'eng began to occupy cities, acquire a "title," establish a peasant revolutionary regime, and clearly promulgate a political program embracing "equal distribution of land" and "abolition of tax," besides formulating a strategic policy of invading Peking, the ruling center of the Ming Dynasty. This marked the flying leap of the late Ming peasant war from the lower to the higher stage. The insurent army led by Li Tzu-ch'eng replaced the feudal regime headed by Emperor Ch'ung Chen with the revolutionary regime of peasants, using revolutionary practice to negate and repudiate Water Margin's capitulationist line of opposing only corrupt officials but not the emperor. This fact shows that the development of the peasant revolution was inversely proportionate to the degree of Water Margin's impact. Only by defeating the capitulationist line preached by Water Margin could the revolutionary peasants incessantly deepen the revolution.

Like the angry waves on the high seas, the late Ming peasant wars not only swept away the Ming imperial court but also clearly distinguished the features of various characters of the revolutionary contingent. Li Tzu-ch'eng, "Flying Mountain Tiger" Liu Kuo-neng, and "Sky Overturning Falcon" Kao Chieh came from the same class and together joined the peasant uprising. But in the end they took entirely different roads. At the very outset, Li served under Wang Tso-kua. When Wang surrendered, Li refused to do so and joined the insurgent force led by Chang Ts'un-meng. When Chang surrendered, Li went to Kao Ying-hsiang, who stood firm on the uprising. From beginning to end, he was against surrender and resisted the capitulationist line preached by Water Margin, showing the truly heroic features of a peasant revolution leader. Both Liu Kuo-neng and Kao Chieh were Li's subordinates. But later one after the other they surrendered to the Ming imperial court and thus became despicable renegades. They were originally identified with the same revolutionary faction. With the deepening of the revolution, however, they became one divided into two. Both Liu and Kao originally belonged to the peasantry. Influenced by the capitulationist trend of thought, they degenerated into colluding with the enemy class and became the sworn foes of the peasant insurgent army. Liu was "pious by nature." He "surrendered in deference to his mother's wish." He thus made himself another "filial and righteous third brother" /Sung Chiang/. After he surrendered to the enemy, he fought desperately against the peasant insurgent force. Even after he was captured alive by Li, he still said stubbornly: "Since the court pardoned me and conferred title on me, why should I refuse to die?" The hideous features of a renegade were nowhwere more glaringly illustrated than in this case. After his defection, Kao Chieh likewise was hostile to the peasant insurgent army. Ku Ling, a feudal man of letters in the early Ch'ing, remarked: Kao Chieh and his ilk, 300 years after the publication of the book Water Margin, "rose at first as brigands and later submitted themselves and returned to allegiance, perhaps due to /Lo/ Kuan-chung's influence." By regarding the Water Margin author as the instigator of the renegades from the peasant revolution, he indeed had some analytical power.

The sharp antagonism between the heroes and renegades in the late Ming peasant wars illustrates that the different attitudes toward the capitulationist ideas preached in Water Margin could have directly led to two different endings -- whether to keep to struggling to the very end or to compromise and surrender in the middle of the course. Moreover, in the case of the leaders of the peasant revolution, the different degrees of resisting and repudiating the capitulationist trend of thought could likewise influence their performance and roles in the revolutionary undertaking. Here, we can take Chang Hsien-chung as an example. According to recorded history, "Chang Hsien-chung was crafty for he asked people to tell books like The Three Kingdoms and Water Margin so he could emulate stratagems like laying an ambush and springing an assault." Since Water Margin's depictions of battle scenes, such as the "Three Attacks on Chuchiachuang," embrace the element of dialectics, it is quite understandable for the peasant insurgent army to absorb some combat experience from the book. However, since Chang Hsien-chung did not strictly distinguish military operations from Water Margin's capitulationist theme, he was to a certain extent influenced by the idea of opposing only corrupt officials but not the emperor. Praising Fang Kung-yüeh, a so-called "incorrupt official," he said: "If everyone keeps away from money as you do, how could I ever become a bandit?" This reveals the deep influence of Water Margin on him. Like a meandering river which twists and turns, Chang Hsien-chung took a tortuous revolutionary road. He had illusions about the Ming imperial court, once accepted the "offer of appeasement and enlistment" and attempted to persuade Li Tzu-ch'eng to do the same. By taking a wrong step, he not only landed himself in the whirlpool but also caused the late Ming peasant war to shift to a low gear. This was indeed a serious error of line. At that time the Ming court adopted the stratagem of "appeasing" one faction and suppressing another. When Sung Chiang surrendered, the Sung court wanted him to fight Fang La. Similarly, the Ming court tried to force Chang Hsien-chung to "kill the brigands to vindicate himself" and show his sincerity by "attacking and killing" Li Tzu-ch'eng. However, Chang Hsien-chung after all was no Sung Chiang. He refused to disarm and declined to attack Li Tzu-ch'eng and other insurgent forces. The enemy in this case served as a teacher by negative example and in revolutionary practice Chang eventually recognized the Ming court's trick of "appeasing first and suppressing later." Once he overcame the tendency of falling under the capitulationist trend of thought and having zigzagged his way, he raised once again the revolutionary banner of rebellion and advanced alongside the revolutionary torrent. This fact once more vividly proves that only by defeating the capitulationist line preached in Water Margin can we truly keep to revolutionary struggles and prevent the revolution from being abandoned halfway.

Chairman Mao has said: "Like all roads in the world on which things move, the revolutionary road is always tortuous and not straight." The complex phenomena that appear on the devious revolutionary road require that we both have a good grasp of the Marxist method of class analysis and constantly improve our power of understanding and perception. To learn how to perceive the essence through its appearance, we must hold fast to the weapon of materialist dialectics -- finding the differences from

similar things and similarities from seemingly different things. Only by doing so can we see from the wave that appears on the surface the whirlpools or adverse current that appear underneath the deep current. Water Margin indeed serves as truly fine teaching material by negative example. Its reactionary function in the late Ming peasant wars educates the revolutionary people by negative example that the revolutionary tide will eventually surge forth and toward a bright future and this can in no way be stopped by anybody, despite the many high mountains and dangerous rapids as well as tortuous rivers it has to pass through.

* * *

Comment on Hu Shih's Verification of Water Margin

by

Yü Ch'iu-yü (余秋雨)

(Hsüeh-hsi yü P'i-p'an /Study and Criticism/, No. 10, October 14, 1975)

Hu Shih, a notorious capitulationist in modern Chinese history, betrayed the May 4 New Cultural Movement and surrendered to the Northern warlords, the Kuomintang reactionaries and American imperialism. In his lifetime he wrote articles running to about 70,000 words to verify and comment on Water Margin. What merits reading is a capitulationist's views on capitulationism.

I

In commenting on Water Margin Hu Shih made frequent references to Chin Sheng-t'an. His attitude toward Chin, however, was quite extraordinary. On the one hand, he was seemingly critical of Chin and declared that "he was more pedantic and detestable than the pedants of Sanchia Village."* Chin's "subjective views akin to fanciful invention truly did the ancients a great injustice!""** Hu even openly asserted that he himself "do not approve of Chin Sheng-t'an's commentaries on Water Margin."*** On the other hand, he was full of praises for Chin's commentaries on the novel and said they displayed "great insight and boldness!"+ He remarked that "Chin Sheng-t'an's eloquence was matchless and his style of writing particularly moving." "Among the critics of Chinese fiction, his authority surpassed that of such prominent critics as Wang Shih-chen, Li Chih, Chung Hsing."++ Why did Hu take such an attitude when he was referring to the same person's commentaries on the same book?

There were different reasons behind Hu's damning and eulogizing. He reviled Chin because "he misunderstood Water Margin's intention. He did not realize that what had been deleted from the 70-chapter version -- events that followed the acceptance of the amnesty and enlistment offer -- made the book "more anti-government."+++ Just take note of the word "misunderstanding"

---

* Hu Shih's Cultural Legacy, p. 710.

** Ibid.

*** Ibid., p. 711.

\+ Ibid., p. 704.

++ Hu Shih's Cultural Legacy, Third Collection, p. 656.

+++ Hu Shih's Cultural Legacy, p. 764.

used by Hu Shih. If Water Margin was described as an anti-government book and became more so after the deletion, then there would be no "misunderstanding" to speak of. If Chin were anti-government, then his deletion of the episode about accepting amnesty and enlistment should not have been considered as "misunderstanding" at all. Rather, what irritated Hu Shih was that a person who was loyal to the feudal court should have done such a foolish thing in the book that pledged loyalty to the feudal state.

Lenin once pointed out: "All oppressing classes are in need of two social functions in order to maintain their rule: one is the function of the hangman and the other is the function of the priest. The hangman represses the resistance and violence of the oppressed. The priest consoles the oppressed, ... in this way causing them to tolerate this kind of rule, abandon their revolutionary actions, dissolve their revolutionary ardor and undermine their revolutionary determination."* However, nobody in the reactionary ruling class at any time understands and exercises these two social functions in exactly the same way. Chin Sheng-t'an and the Water Margin author differed in their respective approaches. The book focuses on the depiction of two types of "priest" in the feudal court -- Su Yüan-ching and Chang Shu-yeh who hold the "imperial edict" and Sung Chiang and Lu Chün-i who wave the "almond yellow banner" -- and how they employ different means to "console" those members of the peasant insurgent army "driven to Liangshan" so they would "abandon their revolutionary actions, dissolve their revolutionary ardor and undermine their revolutionary determination." Chin Sheng-t'an lived in the period from the late Ming to the early Ch'ing, a period marked by the rumblings of the surging peasant uprisings and failure of the reactionary ruler's "enlistment moves." His obsession with defending the feudal court caused him to stress in particular the hangman's function and to cast doubts about the role of the priest. He expected to see, as pointed out by Lu Hsün, "a 'Chi Shu-yeh' in his dreams, who would kill all the Sung Chiangs."** He therefore deleted the episodes about "amnesty and enlistment" from Water Margin and inserted instead the scene of "massacre" in his "dreams" in the novel as the ending.

Which of the two endings is more in accord with the interests of the reactionary ruling class? Hu Shih approved of the ending not left out by Chin Sheng-t'an:

> "The final section -- returning from the expedition to put down Fang La -- contains several particularly moving episodes, such as scenes depicting the death of Lu Chih-sheng, the departure of Yen Ch'ing,

---

* "Bankruptcy of the Second International," Selected Works of Lenin, Vol. II, p. 638.

** "Southern Tone and Northern Tune Collection: On Chin Sheng-t'an," Complete Works of Lu Hsün, Vol. V, pp. 121-122.

the demise of Sung Chiang and the dreams of Hui Tsung, passages that savor of literary flavor."*

The "quelling" of Fang La and the decimation of the Liangshan insurgent army -- that is, the collapse of two insurgent forces after they had been locked in desperate combat -- were naturally more ruthless and thorough than the wiping out of a single Liangshan stronghold designed by Chin Sheng-t'an. This is one aspect. What is more important is that although Chin's design gives undisguised expression to the reactionary rulers' despicable desire to strangle the people's revolution, as Lu Hsün observed, "in very rare cases has the revolution ever been retarded by rolling heads"** Since it was not easy to attain this desire, Chin Sheng-t'an had to bring this about in a "dream," though imagined strength was always feeble and untruthful. Hu Shih was in favor of this ending because alternate use of the insidious tactics of "appeasement" and "suppression" was not only far more practical than dreaming in achieving reactionary artistic effects but also provided the reactionary rulers with the counter-revolutionary tactics of alternately employing two types of social functions. No wonder Hu Shih was "impressed" and found the "flavor."

The capitulationists serve as an important tool for the reactionary rulers to exercise two kinds of social functions. Chin Sheng-t'an "dreamed of a 'Chi Shu-yeh' who would kill all the Sung Chiangs." This shows he was skeptical of "enlistment" because he attached no importance to such capitulationists as Sung Chiang. Hu Shih blamed him for hating Sung Chiang and for mistakenly thinking that Water Margin also abused Sung. He wrote: "He /Chin/ was wrong, thinking that since the 70-chapter version did not approve of enlistment it detested people like Sung Chiang.... He made the glaring blunder of regarding Shih Nai-an's laudatory references to Sung Chiang as castigations of Sung."*** In Hu Shih's opinion, Chin made this "mistake" in the same way as Yü Chung-hua, author of Tang K'ou-chih, did. Yü likewise did not approve of the court's "enlistment" of the "brigands" and he even did not allow the Sung Chiangs to surrender. So he disposed of them with a stroke of the pen, so that "future generations may clearly understand the distinction between brigands and those who are loyal and have a sense of justice, a distinction that brooks no ambiguity!" The events that developed were quite intriguing. Sung Chiang the capitulationist pretended to join the revolution in order to pledge allegiance to the emperor and to dupe the insurgent army. But the result was that the muddle-headed diehards in the reactionary camp failed to see this. They fought a "mistaken battle" because they did not recognize their spies hiding there. That is why Hu Shih retorted by branding them as "pedantic" and did his utmost to put back on Sung Chiang's head the hat of "loyalty" removed by them. He cited the final episode about

---

* Hu Shih's Cultural Legacy, Third Collection, p. 654.

** "Three Leisures Collection: General View of Extermination of Communism," Complete Works of Lu Hsün, Vol. IV, pp. 116-117.

*** Hu Shih's Cultural Legacy, p. 764.

a dying Sung Chiang poisoning Li K'uei to death for fear of the latter's defection, and praised this section as "the finest chapter" and "a strikingly pathetic article" in the last 30 chapters of the Water Margin of Loyalty and Justice.* Moreover, he also praised the sections in the Sequel to Water Margin written by Ch'en Ch'en, which confirms capitulationism preached in Water Margin, particularly the section about the emperor praising Sung Chiang as a "staunch advocate of loyalty and justice."** In short, Hu Shih evasively dropped the hint to persons of his own camp that they should perceive Sung's "loyal and just" nature through his "assumed" disguise and should avoid doing him an "injustice." This allusion of Hu Shih's should arouse our vigilance. People like Chin and Yü attacked Sung because they saw only his disguise while some of our comrades extolled him for the same purpose. Therefore, Hu criticized Chin and Yü for "taking friend as foe." Objectively, this also serves as criticism by negative example of certain comrades for taking foe as friend.

Hu Shih put Chin Sheng-t'an and Yü Chung-hua in the same category. At the same time he regarded himself as a true admirer of the Water Margin author. This explains why he repeatedly advertised himself as having found out the author's "real intention." It appears that in the past hundreds of years representatives of the reactionary ruling class have been confined to these two groups in respect of their attitudes toward the Liangshan peasant uprising in the sphere of creative writing and literary criticism. Chin Sheng-t'an's deletion and Yü Chung-hua's continuation were involved in squabbles that did not resemble squabbles with the Shih Nai-an--Lo Kuan-chung group. Hu Shih's verification kept this dispute alive in the 20th century. But it should not be forgotten that in the controversy over ways of coping with the peasant uprisings within the reactionary camp a common language between them was not lacking. This development was not very different from the squabbles between the two groups in Water Margin -- Su Yüan-ching and Chang Shu-yeh on one side and T'ung Kuan and Kao Ch'iu on the other. Therefore, Hu Shih not only did not basically negate Chin Sheng-t'an and Yü Chung-hua, but forgave them once he realized that their "pedantry" was derived from their bitter resentment against peasant uprisings. At the end of "Verification of Water Margin," he said:

> "One who does not understand the great disorder caused by the wandering brigands toward the end of the Ming will not understand why Chin Sheng-t'an's views on Water Margin are so pedantic."
>
> "One who does not understand the widespread turmoil caused by the bandits between the reigns of Chia Ch'ing and Tao Kuang will not understand Yü Chung-hua's Tang K'ou-chih."***

---

* Hu Shih's Cultural Legacy, pp. 788-789.

** Hu Shih's Cultural Legacy, Second Collection, p. 217.

*** Hu Shih's Cultural Legacy, pp. 766-767.

By alternately deriding and praising them, Hu Shih was applying the so-called "historical relationship" for their defense. He appeared to be looking into historical causes, but actually he was juggling with experimentalism on the basis of reactionary political criteria and the idealist conception of history. Chin Sheng-t'an was against enlistment, but Hu Shih said Chin did so because he "saw with his own eyes how the marauders toward the end of the Ming pretended to surrender to the government troops but later defected and rebelled again, with the result that the whole situation got out of control."* It is altogether understandable that although the version with Chin's commentaries savors of "pedantry" it is wonderful in the pedantic sense, an "indelible wonder book."** His mutilation of Water Margin thus became at once a "bold" and fine thing. "He boldly deleted all the episodes after Chapter 70 and added an episode about Lu Chün-i's dream -- an obvious attempt to tell people that only after the brigands are exterminated can there be peace throughout the land."*** As a matter of fact, this reactionary logic preached by Chin Sheng-t'an is also the main theme of Water Margin and Hu Shih's credo. No matter how sharply they disagreed and fiercely fought each other, the common ideal of "exterminating" the revolution for the sake of seeking "peace" in a "world" dominated by the landlord class dictatorship remained unchanged. In this sense, it was entirely possible and natural to unify the group favoring "amnesty and enlistment" with that favoring "suppression," to unify the propaganda on capitulationism and the proposal for total extermination. Once Hu Shih sensed the spread of the people's fierce revolutionary flames in the long journey in history, didn't he immediately line up all those who had contributed to the writing, deletion, continuation and verification of Water Margin? Didn't an "argumentative Chin Sheng-t'an"+ become a "Sheng-t'an of matchless eloquence"?

II

Hu Shih almost regarded all the reactionary steps taken by Chin and yü in respect of Water Margin as conforming to the needs of the time. People could not help asking Hu about the underlying causes which prompted him to produce so many verifications of Water Margin. In his own words, he admonished his reader: "Don't take these verifications of fiction as my ideas about teaching you to read novels."++ Well, let us take a look at the historical background and actual political implications of these "verifications."

---

* Hu Shih's Cultural Legacy, p. 765.

** Ibid., p. 760.

*** Hu Shih's Cultural Legacy, Third Collection, p. 656.

\+ Hu Shih's Cultural Legacy, p. 765.

++ "Introducing My Thought," Selected Essays of Hu Shih, p. 24.

Hu Shih's commentaries on Water Margin focus on two periods: the period after the May 4 Movement and the period following the defeat of the First Revolutionary Civil War. At a juncture when the surging tide was beginning to subside and dark clouds were gathering, inevitably "some people deserted the army, some took to the wilderness, some abandoned themselves, and some rebelled." Hu Shih was representative of the defectors from the May 4 New Cultural Movement. As a continuation of this defection, he joined and served the Kuomintang reactionaries in the period following the defeat of the First Revolutionary Civil War. He wrote commentaries on Water Margin during such periods for the two-fold purpose of contributing ideas to the reactionaries for suppressing the revolution and of defending his action in joining the reactionaries.

Hu Shih wrote "Verification of Water Margin" and "Sequel to Verification" in 1920 and 1921 respectively. After going through the controversies regarding "Problems and Isms" and those relating to the future of Hsin Ch'ing-nien /New Youth/, the ranks of the May 4 New Cultural Movement were clearly showing signs of falling apart. Both struggles involved the question of how to cope with the existing institutions and the incumbent government. Lu Hsün then unequivocally stood for the complete collapse of old things and the fighting principle of leaving the "headaches to the officials."* Proceeding from the stand of the right-wing bourgeoisie, Hu was dismayed over and apprehensive of the development of the movement in which he had taken part into an all-encompassing people's revolution. Therefore, he made repeated attempts to blunt the sharp edge of struggle of "May 4" and professed his hostility to the people's revolution. On numerous occasions, he revealed his remorse and intention to surrender to the reactionary authorities. Finally he even openly equated himself with Sung Chiang by referring to his memoirs of his involvement in the May 4 Movement as "driven to Liangshan." In this sense, it is by no means accidental that in the two articles on verification of Water Margin he subtly explained the implications of his sympathy for suppression and advocacy of amnesty and enlistment. What is amusing is that he cited in his article the episode about Sung Chiang being murdered by the imperial court to which he pledged his allegiance as proof that the Water Margin author portrayed Sung Chiang as "one who first went astray and then rendered meritorious service," adding that this involved some "real feeling of regret."** As a matter of fact, Hu, rather than the author, should have harbored this "feeling of regret," since it was his hope that the government authorities would not prejudice against his being a modern "loyal subject who has achieved merit" because of the "false step" he had once taken.

Quite by coincidence, the second year after Hu wrote this article, not only did the government of the Northern warlords not discredit him, but even P'u I, the last emperor long spurned by the Chinese people, beckoned him.

---

* Lu Hsün's Correspondence: Letter to Hu Shih on January 3, 1921.

** Hu Shih's Cultural Legacy, p. 789.

In the Forbidden City Hu was more than once received by "His Majesty" and the two had secret talks "not known to outsiders." In 1923, the year following his audience with "His Majesty," Hu wrote "Preface to Two Sequels to Water Margin." The episode about Yen Ch'ing and Yang Lin meeting with Emperor Tao Chün described in Sequal to Water Margin was dwelt upon at length and in most attractive terms! The emperor commended Sung Chiang for being a "loyal and upright person who has rendered considerable meritorious services" and declared he would "confer additional honors on Sung and his offspring, and build a temple for him." Yen Ch'ing, addressed by the emperor as a "loyal subject in the woods," fell on his knees to thank the emperor while Yang Lin later deeply regretted having long abused the emperor in the days when he was at the mountain stronghold. He added, "Having witnessed this scene today, even I myself was on the verge of tears."* After citing this passage, Hu Shih commented:

> This section of the text truly deserves being called "pathetic"! Nothing finer has ever been written since countless historical novels were published through the succeeding ages.... and nothing better since novelists wrote about the twilight days of the emperors!**

Hu Shih's outpourings of sentiment in his writings caused people to wonder if he had discovered his own shadow in the episode about the meeting between "loyal subjects in the woods" and the emperor, if he was able to find his own footprints and if he had found something he could turn to when he was lost for sentiments.

Since then Hu Shih had always regarded himself as a "loyal subject in the woods," prating about "liberty" and "human rights" outside the court and toadying on the imperial court. In June 1929, not long after Chiang Kai-shek set up his counter-revolutionary regime on a pool of blood shed by Communists and the revolutionary people, Hu Shih again commented on Water Margin. In "Preface to the 120-Chapter Water Margin of Loyalty and Justice," he assessed Chin Sheng-t'an in a more favorable light, heaping praises on his reactionary ideas in respect of the conviction that "only after the brigands are exterminated can there be peace under heaven." Furthermore, he emphasized anew that Water Margin's final section about Sung Chiang pledging allegiance to the emperor was "most moving."*** To understand the actual significance of Hu's commentaries on Water Margin, two things which happened not long afterward are worth looking into. One was about the large-scale military "encirclement and suppression" campaign carried out by Chiang Kai-shek against our red revolutionary base areas; the other was Chiang's meeting with Hu to seek the latter's "views on the general situation."

---

* Hu Shih's Cultural Legacy, Second Collection, pp. 215-217.

** Ibid., p. 217.

*** Hu Shih's Cultural Legacy, Third Collection, p. 654.

Since then, as was known to everybody, Hu gradually turned from a "loyal subject in the woods" into a "prominent official" in the Chiang family imperial court.

In short, proposals for suppressing the people's revolution emanated again and again from Hu's commentaries on Water Margin, while his desire to join and serve the reactionary court was repeatedly expressed in the same commentaries. The coincidence of this series of events may have been accidental. But as Engels pointed out: "What appears to be accidental is always controlled by the internal hidden laws."* This law is that modern reactionaries are bound to draw experience from ancient reactionaries in strangling the revolution and are bound to inherit from the latter the spiritual tradition of selling themselves for honor.

A law is not just applicable to only one thing at a certain time. As a comprador man of letters fostered by imperialism, Hu's propaganda on capitulationism throughout his life must be summed up as capitulation to imperialism. Therefore, his commentaries on Water Margin also served as an indirect tool for preaching national capitulationism. Since he was not referring to the "great Sung emperor" when he preached "pledging allegiance to the Son of Heaven," then, this "Son of Heaven" might change incessantly: he could be a Northern warlord, P'u I, Chiang Kai-shek, and of course an imperialist chieftain. While Hu was studying in the United States, he once wrote a song which ended with the words "long life to the reigning sovereign." "Sovereign" exactly meant the US imperialist chieftain. On the eve of the War of Resistance Against Japan, Hu proposed to Japanese imperialism a stratagem for "appeasing" the whole Chinese nation: "conquering the hearts of the Chinese."** In fact he pledged full allegiance to the Japanese emperor.

In other words, Water Margin provided Hu Shih with multiple applications: in class struggle he equated himself with Sung Chiang; in national struggle he hoped he and his master, Chiang Kai-shek, could become Sung Chiangs, prostrating themselves before the foreign masters. The imperialists appreciated this. At the crucial juncture of the anti-Japanese war in 1942, a Japanese imperialist "scholar" exclaimed his approbation after reading Water Margin. Why? Because he perceived from the novel:

> "The stand taken by Chiang Kai-shek in Chungking today is similar to that of Sung Chiang in the final phase of Liangshan Mountain."***

---

* "Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy," Selected Works of Marx and Engels, Vol. IV, p. 243.

** "The Japanese Should Awaken," Independent Review, No. 42.

*** K. Izaka, "New Verification of Water Margin," Manchuria Book Distribution Company.

Nothing is more obvious than the above passage. The relationship between Chiang Kai-shek and Japanese imperialism was like that between Sung Chiang and the emperor. Didn't Water Margin follow Hu Shih's desire by naturally turning to national capitulationism? No wonder the Japanese "scholar" made this particularly clear: "Water Margin is precisely what Hu Shih has said, a product of sentiments and ideas." As regards what "sentiments" and what "ideas" were implied, they were clear to all. Hu Shih tried to use "nationalism" as a smokescreen to hoodwink his readers. He said that the fact that Sung Chiang and others practiced capitulationism was at least noteworthy in that it was related to the cause of "protecting the emperor and saving the nation." Unfortunately, by their undeniable act of national betrayal, he and his master, Chiang Kai-shek, provided the best answer. The imperialists also indirectly provided eloquent evidence. "In the last analysis, national struggle is a matter of class struggle." Only the people are the true guardians of national interests. There is no wide gulf between "protecting the emperor and saving the nation" and "protecting the emperor and selling the nation." When "massive government troops arrived," all capitulationists would "accept the offer of amnesty and enlistment." The same thing will happen whether the "massive government troops" of the reactionary court or the "massive troops" of foreign countries arrive.

III

Having comprehended this series of political motives behind Hu Shih's veritifcations and commentaries on Water Margin, we can further understand the passage he wrote at the end of the article "Later Verification of Water Margin":

> I wrote 40,000-50,000 characters in verifying Water Margin. I know people will laugh at me for not caring about mental exertions and time. But I feel that efforts expended on Water Margin are worthwhile.*

This is purely juggling and exhibitionism. However, this clearly indicates how a capitulationist attached great importance to a novel which preaches capitulationism. The experience of class struggle tells us that what the enemy cares should not be dismissed lightly. We must counter it and draw lessons from the tit-for-tat encounter. Chairman Mao pointed out recently: "The merit of the book Water Margin lies precisely in the portrayal of capitulation. It serves as teaching material by negative example to help all people recognize capitulationists." In order to recognize, criticize and defeat the capitulationists in a better way, we might as well learn something from the enemy by expending "some effort and time" on commenting on Water Margin.

Decades before, Hu Shih had sensed that Marxism-Leninism would be the arch-enemy of capitulationism. Therefore, in the years when Marxism-Leninism began to spread, he lured people to "read Water Margin with an open

---

* Hu Shih's Cultural Legacy, p. 800.

mind and without subjective prejudice."* What he meant by "subjective prejudice" obviously referred to the "isms" he detested -- a correct ideological weapon and revolutionary world outlook. Later, he revealingly declared that the reason why he took up the verification of novels was that he was afraid that his readers might be "led by the nose by Marx, Lenin and Stalin," and so he provided them with some "skills in self-defense."** In his verifications of Water Margin he spared no effort to "guard" against Marxist-Leninist criticism of capitulationism. By negative example the enemy's words and deeds serve to distinguish in principle Marxism-Leninism from capitulationism and this perhaps may awaken those who like to interpret capitulationism as "historical materialism." Objective facts which separate truth from fallacy show that only by holding fast to the ideological weapon of Marxism-Leninism can we completely repudiate revisionism and capitulationism in commenting on Water Margin and carry through to the end the proletarian revolution which has been desperately obstructed by people like Hu Shih.

-- If Hu Shih's verifications and commentaries on Water Margin have been able to produce such effects, then the proletarian revolution will always be grateful to them as it has to the book Water Margin, which serves as teaching material by negative example.

* * *

---

* Hu Shih's Cultural Legacy, p. 762.

** "Introducing My Thought."

A Tentative Discussion on Wu Yung

by

Chang Chih-ming (章智明) and Wan Shao-yüan (宛紹元)

(Hsüeh-hsi yü P'i-p'an /Study and Criticism/, No. 10, October 14, 1975)

Through his life, Wu Yung experienced the entire course of the Liangshan peasant uprising from its rise to growth to defeat. Moreover, he held the important position as the stronghold's chief of staff and was involved in the vortex of struggle from first to last. Thus, Wu was an attractive character in Water Margin.

Wu was an intellectual. But from the fact that "he was wearing a cap low down on his brow, a large loose-fitting gown of hemper cloth with a black border, and a belt of the color of tea" and that he had intimate relations with the three Juan brothers -- the poor fishermen -- it was evident that both his economic and social standing was rather humble. During the stormy years of the peasant revolution everyone had to show a certain attitude according to his own class stand. Wu showed his clearcut stand against the feudal ruling class and for the peasant uprising by his participation in the revolutionary action of "seizing the birthday presents by strategy." When Liu T'ang told him that Grand Secretary Liang had robbed "valuables to the value of one hundred thousand strings of cash, which he will send to the Eastern Capital for presentation as a birthday gift to his father-in-law, Prime Minister Ts'ai Ch'ing," Wu immediately declared his support for Ch'ao Kai's plan to seize "this ill-gotten money." On his own initiative, he persuaded Juan the Second, the Fifth and the Seventh to join in, and drew up a battle plan to this end. "If they are armed, we must use force; if they are on their guard, we must use strategy." The battle was fought and won at Huanghua Ridge. This was the most brilliant chapter in Wu's early revolutionary activities.

Subsequently, Wu headed for Liangshan. Since he went to the mountain to join the peasant revolution, he was bound to come into sharp conflict with Wang Lun, the White Clothes Scholar who would not allow others to make revolution. Wu simply despised Wang whose head was full of Confucian ideas, and supported Lin Ch'ung's fight against him, removing an obstacle to the development of the peasant revolution and helping build Ch'ao Kai's leading position in Liangshan. From then on, Wu faithfully carried out Ch'ao's revolutionary line of persisting in the peasant uprising, and assisted Ch'ao in storing up grain, building boats, making weapons and training men. They defeated the invading government troops and consolidated the peasant revolutionary base. Under the guidance of Ch'ao's line, Wu carefully plotted and took a direct part in a number of battles, such as the offensives on Chiangchou, Kaot'ang, Ch'ingchou and Huashan, dealing severe blows to the feudal ruling class and its flunkeys. Their brilliant victories laid a sound foundation for their great objective of "overthrowing the great Sung emperor."

Ch'ao was killed by an arrow just when the Liangshan cause was gradually flourishing, and it was a painful loss. At this critical juncture, Wu faced a severe test over the question of whether he should carry on Ch'ao's correct line and wage a resolute struggle against Sung Chiang the capitulationist who tried to tamper with Ch'ao's line.

It took Wu some time to know Sung. Originally they were fellow townsmen from Yunch'eng county. But owing to the fact that one was a village teacher of low social status and the other was a bureaucrat of the feudal yamen, "although we /Wu and Sung/ lived so close to each other, I /Wu/ never had the chance to meet him." Wu's first meeting with Sung was at Ch'ao's manor. At that time, Wu was taken in by the "honorable" deed of Sung who went at his own peril to Tungchi Village to ask Ch'ao to flee. "Had he not told us, we would all be caught in the net like fish." Wu took Sung almost for a savior, and thanked him again and again. While on his way to exile in Chiangchou, his face branded as a criminal, Sung refused the offer of Liu T'ang and other heroes of Liangshan to rescue and take him to the mountain, excusing himself with profuse words of loyalty and filial piety. He even would not allow Hua Jung to remove his cangue, fearing lest this would "infringe on the state regulations." It was then that Wu realized from his sharp political sense that Sung had no intention of going to the mountain, and thus took a different attitude from that of Liu T'ang and Hua Jung. He just said to Sung: "I understand your meaning. It's quite simple: we won't keep you here in the mountain." In a most casual manner he tactfully made this loyal subject and filial son of the feudal dynasty leave the revolutionary base. Later, when Sung managed to "take refuge" in Liangshan and his motive of trying to induce the peasant insurgent army to surrender was gradually revealed, Wu became more and more alert against him. Whenever Sung took the men out alone, Wu would follow and insist on taking part in drawing up combat plans and directing the fighting. Sung was restrained to a certain extent, and the fact that Ch'ao did not name his successor before he died showed that he, too, was on guard against Sung. Wu was aware of this. So, when Liangshan had to find a new chief, he did not forget Ch'ao's will, and merely persuaded Sung to take the leading position temporarily. In front of everybody he said to Sung: "We request you to occupy the chair temporarily. We can talk the matter over again some time later." At that time, since it was decided to have Sung as the successor, it was undeniably most admirable of Wu to say this. Though Wu put it in a polite way, his message was very clear: If Sung proved himself unworthy of the position, he could be removed. Undoubtedly, Wu's move served a caveat to Sung in practicing capitulationism and reminded the Liangshan heroes to be on their guard as well.

Since Sung Chiang at the Chrysanthemum banquet disclosed his capitulation plans -- "May the King of Heaven issue a decree to grant us amnesty soon," the internal struggle at Liangshan for and against accepting the offer of amnesty and enlistment had risen to a climax. Wu refused to surrender and sided with Li K'uei, Juan the Second, the Fifth and the Seventh in a necessary struggle against Sung. When Sung, anxiously trying to curry favor with Li Shih-shih and take the back door,

went to the Eastern Capital under the pretext of visiting the Lantern Festival, Wu was suspicious. "No!" said Wu categorically, and he tried to dissuade Sung from going. When Sung Hui Tsung sent General Ch'en to the mountain to "proclaim clemency to the water margin army," Sung was so happy that he was ready to lay down his arms and surrender. Wu came forward and refuted Sung's capitulationist theory of "accepting the amnesty and enlistment and becoming officials of the state." Wu urged him to cast away illusions and fight back with force, saying "when this man leads the army here, we'll wipe out his men and horses, and make him tremble with fear even in his dreams." How bold! When Juan the Seventh secretly changed the imperial wine and Li K'uei angrily tore up the decree offering amnesty and frustrated the amnesty plot, Sung was embarrassed and angry. Wu warned him once more: "Don't be deceived by the offer." Then, Wu personally deployed the men and united the Liangshan heroes. They won a number of battles and smashed the "encirclement and suppression" campaigns by the several hundred thousand reactionary troops under the direct command of T'ung Kuan and Kao Ch'iu. When the imperial court sent someone to offer amnesty and enlistment a second time, Wu made preparations for combat, depending on revolutionaries like Li K'uei and the three Juan brothers, and he made Hua Jung shoot an arrow at the envoy in the face as he was reading the decree. The amnesty plot was thwarted once again.

When Sung conspired with the court and accepted the amnesty and enlistment offer, Wu's revolutionary passion was gravely dampened. Though he still had deep feelings for Ch'ao's line and continued to struggle against Sung to a certain degree, the tides were beginning to ebb. The moment Sung accepted the amnesty, he lost no time in "arranging for the men and their families to return home" and thus dismantling the mountain stronghold. Wu disapproved, and demanded to "keep the brothers and their families in the mountain stronghold" so as to preserve the only ray of hope of reviving the Liangshan cause, showing his love for the revolutionary base area which he took part in founding. On their way back to the capital from an expedition against Wang Ch'ing, the three Juan brothers and other leaders of the naval force called on Wu and discussed with him a plan of returning to Liangshan. Inspired by the revolutionary passion of these fishermen brothers, Wu gave Sung a hint about their desire to go back to the mountain to raise the flag of rebellion again. Yet regrettably, this proposal, which could have saved the peasant revolutionary cause, was vetoed by Sung with his theory of "loyalty and justice." This event was the last in which we heard of Wu for his opposition to accepting the amnesty offer and capitulation. From then on, he "dared not say anything more."

From the time he took the initiative in joining the three Juan brothers in seizing the birth presents to the time when he accepted the imperial clemency and enlistment and could no longer firmly support the three Juan brothers in going back to Liangshan, Wu completed a tortuous revolutionary course. From then on, he had no choice but to follow Sung in attacking Fang La. But the bloody lessons did not awaken him, nor could be extricate himself from the fetters of Sung's reactionary "justice." Whatever Sung wanted him to do, he had to do. After their

return from the attack on Fang La, the Liangshan heroes were either dead or went away. This upset Wu greatly. Overwhelmed with loneliness and a sense of guilt, he "took his boy servant and went to take up a post in Wu Sheng's army." There, he could no longer see Li K'uei's fierce revolutionary whirlwind nor ever hear again the furious war cries of the three Juan brothers. "Since taking up his post, he often felt very unhappy at heart." What was the way out from there? Wu didn't know. He felt lost and anguished. Finally he chose to die because Sung was dead. The tragedy of Wu, who hanged himself in front of Sung's grave, led one to the following conclusion on this intellectual-born revolutionary of Liangshan: If an intellectual fails to thoroughly overcome his inherent weakness and oscillation during revolutionary practice, he will inevitably head for compromise in the end.

In the beginning, Wu Yung wasn't the only intellectual among the Liangshan revolutionary forces composed mainly of bankrupt peasants, fishermen and craftsmen. There were others like Wang Lun, Hsiao Jang and Chiang Ching. As they belonged to different classes and had different motives for joining the revolution, they ended up taking different paths. Just as Lenin said: "For the first time revolution will give all classes a real political baptism. These classes will appear in the revolution with a definite political image, revealing what they are not only from the programs and tactical slogan of their own thinkers, but also from their open political actions among the masses." The behavior and ending of the Liangshan intellectuals who represented different class interests in the revolutionary movement profoundly illustrate this. Wang Lun, who was the first to open up the mountain stronghold, was an unsuccessful candidate in the imperial civil service examination, and power struggle within the landlord class drove him to the mountain. He did not go to the mountain to make revolution; instead, he wanted to achieve by looting what he failed to achieve in the "examination hall." Though he joined the revolution, he was afraid of it. He was so narrow-minded that he could not tolerate others, and turned a lot of people who wanted to make revolution away from the mountain. This gravely hindered the consolidation and development of the peasant revolutionary base. A man of letters of the declining class who speculated in and opposed the revolution was finally torn into pieces by Lin Ch'ung, and could deserve no better end. Likewise an unsuccessful candidate in the imperial civil service examination, Chiang Ching differed from Wang Lun in that he "gave up literature and took up arms." Dissatisfied with the seamy feudal society, he embarked on the road of rebellion. During his prolonged struggle from Huangmen Mountain to Liangshan, he gradually reformed and raised his revolutionary consciousness. Even when Sung's line gained complete supremacy in Liangshan, he refused to betray himself. Finally, when Sung accepted an official appointment offered by the court, Chiang declined to accept his and "returned to T'anchou to lead an ordinary life," being unwilling to follow Sung in working for the feudal ruling class. Though such a way of struggle is not worth learning from, it nevertheless shows his resentment and protest against Sung's surrender. Contrary to Chiang, Hsiao Jang was all for Sung's capitulation line. A "graduate of first degree /Hsiu-ts'ai/ in Chichou City," he was such a good writer that Wu Yung induced

him to go to Liangshan. But Hsiao's presence at Liangshan did not add to the strength of the Liangshan peasant revolution; on the contrary, he became a loyal pawn of Sung the capitulationist. This reactionary intellectual, who refused to change his landlord class stand, was so prized by Sung that he usurped the key position of "controlling the dispatching of troops and officers." In Sung's capitulationist activities, Hsiao was always in the lead, took great pleasure in playing a most shameful role. After the offer of amnesty and enlistment was accepted, he was "given a position in the mansion of Grand Tutor Ts'ai," and continued to play the role of the falcon of the feudal ruling class. He was a lackey after all.

Among the intellectuals of Liangshan, Wu Yung was a more prominent one. As he had close contacts with the laboring people and many years of revolutionary experience, he enjoyed a higher prestige and position and also contributed more to the revolution. Lenin said: Once the intellectuals "merge with the people, they will become a tremendous force in this struggle. Though weak and powerless, they can nevertheless provide the petty bourgeoisie and peasants who constitute vast strata with the very things they lack: knowledge, program, leadership and organization." Such was the role Wu Yung played when he joined the peasant revolution. In a certain sense, Wu could be said to be a "Clever Star" of the peasant revolution. Though Wu was not so strong in revolutionary character as Li K'uei, who had suffered deeply, he paid more attention to tactics of struggle and was unsurpassed by Li in engineering a split of the enemy camp. The three attacks on Chuchiachuang served as a very good illustration. In order to reap political profit, Sung personally led the onslaught against the village. But "on two occasions, lack of knowledge of the situation and use of wrong tactics caused his defeat." Later, Ch'ao Kai sent Wu down the mountain to correct Sung's mistakes, and it was then the table was turned. Just as Chairman Mao pointed out: the tactics were changed after two attacks against Chuchiachuang. "By starting with investigations, they familiarized themselves with the terrain, broke up the alliance among the Lichiachuang, the Huchiachuang and the Chuchiachuang, and had their men hidden within the enemy camp, a method similar to that of the Trojan Horse in a foreign story. When they attacked for a third time, they won." The first two defeats were caused by Sung's erroneous tactical thinking and methods, while the success of the third attack resulted from Wu's brilliant planning and direction. Loyal to Ch'ao's political line of persisting in struggle, Wu displayed his military skills and won a string of victories. These meritorious achievements are indelible.

Historical phenomena are complicated. Behind similar events lie different motives. Wu used scheming or even personally went to lure Li Ying, Chu T'ung and Lu Chün-i into going to Liangshan. This was entirely different from Sung's capitulationist act. Wu did so in order to divide the enemy camp, to rally various forces for the revolutionary ranks, and to consolidate and expand the revolutionary camp; whereas Sung Chiang's purpose behind taking in Kuan Sheng, Hu Yen-cho and Ch'in Ming and colluding with Lu Chün-i was to recruit turncoats and deserters, to expand the capitulationist forces, and to make organizational preparations for

disintegrating the revolutionary camp and surrendering to the imperial court. Later, when Sung wanted to make Lu Chün-i No. 1, he went against Wu's original wishes and met with repeated opposition from the latter. In another instance, Wu and Sung also differed in their attitude toward Kuang Sheng. Sung praised Kuan as "upright and stern," saying that he had no worry when he sent Kuan to attack Tamingfu. But Wu was very suspicious and vigilant, and he decided to "send another good general to keep an eye on him." The different attitudes toward Lu Chün-i and Kuan Sheng showed that Wu and Sung had argued over the question of whom to rely on. Therefore, we should not confuse Wu's tactics of disintegrating the enemy with Sung's scheme of recruiting deserters. Of course, it took some time for Wu to recognize Sung's scheme to organize a capitulationist group, and he lacked sufficient vigilance at the outset. So, when the situation became clear, Wu found himself incapable to change it. For example, through arranging the "seating order for heroes" Sung repeatedly downgraded the Liangshan revolutionaries and promoted the capitulationists. Under those circumstances, only Wu had the influence and position to resist this. But Wu did not do that and, instead, he repeatedly conceded to Sung. This was another manifestation of Wu's weakness.

Wu's life and ending vividly prove the great truth that "the correctness or incorrectness of the ideological and political line decides everything." Under Ch'ao's correct line of persisting in peasant uprisings, Wu acted wisely and decisively, fully demonstrating his outstanding political, military and organizational capabilities in revolutionary struggle. On the contrary, under the rule of Sung's capitulationist line, this fine figure, who once was filled with revolutionary passion, ended up hanging himself and became the sacrifice of the reactionary line. Under the guidance of the correct line Wu advanced step by step, but under the rule of the reactionary line he could not help falling back step by step. His ending tells people a truth by negative example: Intellectuals can accomplish something only when they live with the revolution. This lesson is profound.

* * *

Study and Criticism, No. 10, October 14, 1975

Table of Contents

Study Theory, Sum Up Experience, and Advance Along Chairman Mao's Revolutionary Line

Do a Good Job of Farm Mechanization with the Tachai Spirit - by Chiao Yuan SPRCM 846

How They Strengthen the Brigade-Level Collective Economy SPRCM 846

Commune- and Brigade-Run Industries Must Carry Out the Policy of Taking Agriculture As the Foundation SPRCM 846

A Technically Backward Industry Achieves Automation -- Investigation report on technical transformation of Shanghai's glass bottle industry - by a reporter of this journal

Transform Old Equipment, Create a New Level - by Revolutionary Committee of Shanghai No. 12 Cotton Mill

Film Reviews: The Spirit of Self-Reliance Is Heirloom -- Thoughts after seeing the films "Second Spring" and "Shipbuilding Platform" - by Kao I-lung

Use "Water Margin" As Teaching Material By Negative Example To Help All People Recognize Capitulationists

A Case More Than 300 Years Old - by Lo Ssu-ting SPRCM 847

On Sung Chiang's Struggle Against Kao Ch'iu - by Chai Ch'ing

Comment on Hu Shih's Verification of Water Margin - by Yü Ch'iu-yü SPRCM 851

What To Praise, What To Oppose? -- Comment on Water Margin's capitulationist nature - by Hsü Chi-hsi

A Tentative Discussion on Wu Yung - by Chang Chih-ming and Wan Shao-yüan SPRCM 851

Comment on Sung Chiang's "Going to the Mountain" - by Shih Ch'uan SPRCM 847

Workers, Peasants and Soldiers on Water Margin

Ride on the Crest of Revolution - by Fang Ch'ün, a certain PLA unit

How We Comment on Water Margin - by CCP Committee of Haich'iao Commune, Ch'ungming County

Sung Chiang's "Borrowing" and "Buying" - by Yang Chien-wen, "May 7" Farm

"Strings" and "Gourd" - by Huang Lai-chi, Shanghai Diesel Engine Plant

Machiavellianism and Sung Chiang - by Chou Yung-ch'uang, worker of Shanghai Electric Motor Plant

Fang La -- A Profile - by Ch'i Mao SPRCM 847

Miscellaneous Essay: Initial Discussion on the Memorial Tablet - by Yen Feng

Sum Up Experience in Educational Revolution

Make a Success of Scientific Research Work in University - by Educational Revolution Group of Futan University

Social Investigations

Foundry Workers on Innovation - by Jen Ching

Biographies

Biography of Lu Hsün (V) - by Shih I-ko

* * *

END

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
National Technical Information Service
Springfield, Va. 22161

OFFICIAL BUSINESS

PRINTED MATTER

AN EQUAL OPPORTUNITY EMPLOYER

POSTAGE AND FEES PAID
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
COM-211

U.S.MAIL

CMP X761231 001
UNIV ILLINOIS LIB AT CHICAGO CIRCLE
LIB SERIALS SEC
BOX 8198
CHICAGO IL 60680